Overconfidence has been proven to be "one of the most consistent, powerful and wide spread cognitive biases". In this paper, we develop a model in which a supplier selling to an overconfident retailer invests in acquiring market information. Overconfidence causes the retailer to overestimate the precision of his private information as well as his capacity to acquire information. Our work shows that overconfidence hurts the retailer's profits, and may even eliminate the benefits of information. Instead, the supplier can benefit from the retailer's overconfidence. We demonstrate that this bias with an endogenous information-acquisition effort can coordinate the supply chain to achieve its first-best benchmark.
decision making problem in those situations is how much information should firms collect? A large research based on the models with rational firms gives the answers to this question. The investors (firms) should spend money and time acquiring information up to the point where the marginal benefit of doing so exceeds the marginal cost [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
However, findings gathered from diverse disciplines, such as economic and finance and management have identified that individual cognitive bias can influence the decision-making process in complex and uncertain environments [9] [10]. Among various known psychological biases, overconfidence has been proven to be one of the most consistent, powerful, and widespread biases [11] .
Apart from the field of psychology [12] , this bias has also been observed in a wide range of fields from economics [13] to finance [14] to operations management [15] . In addition, researchers have identified that the bias of overconfidence is relevant to the pull-to-center and bullwhip problems in a managerial context [16] [17] .
With respect to information acquisition, a large body of evidence from experimental research shows that many investors are overconfident when they make acquisition decisions [18] . Specifically, overconfident forecasters overestimate not only the value (precision) of the private signals [19] [20] , but also the productivity in their investment in information [21] . They invest resources in acquiring information in spite of it being unclear that they can even achieve returns that recoup these costs. As a result, they may attain poorer performance.
Although information acquisition has been studied extensively in operations research/operations management, the existing model in literature has largely ignored the cognitive bias (overconfidence in particular) of firms. Therefore, our research explores the consequences of overconfidence for information acquisition investment, aiming to establish whether this bias would eliminate the benefits of information. To achieve this, we develop a behavior game model that incorporates the notion of overconfidence into the information acquisition model pioneered by Fu and Zhu [6] , which has a single supplier selling to an overconfident retailer that can acquire costly demand information. With overconfidence, the retailer overestimates the precision of his private information as well as his capacity to acquire information. Below we summarize our main results and insights.
First, we study how overconfidence causes the information acquisition level to deviate from the first-best benchmark. We find overconfidence can make the retailer overinvest in information acquisition. Second, our analysis shows overconfidence is harmful to the retailer, and excessive overconfidence may even eliminate the benefits of information. But the supplier can benefit from selling to a more biased retailer. Finally, we demonstrate overconfidence with endogens information acquisition can coordinate the supply chain if the total profit margin of a product is low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Sec-tion 2. Section 3 derives the optimal decision in the integrated setting. Section 4 provides the equilibrium analysis for the overconfident retailer in the decentralized setting, and compares integrated case and decentralized case. Based on the analysis above, Section 5 analyzes whether channel coordination can be achieved by overconfidence. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Model
We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier (she) and an over confident retailer (he). The supplier produces a product and sells it to the retailer, who faces a random demand, Note that σ is a measure of the signal's precision in predicting in market condition. The larger the value of σ, the less information the signal has about the market condition. If 1 σ = , the posterior distribution of the market condition is identical to its prior distribution; i.e., the signal contains no useful information.
On the other hand, as 0 σ → , the signal reveals the exact value of the market condition.
The precision of acquired information depends on the retailer's investment in information acquisition. We assume the retailer incurs a cost of v for obtaining a signal that has a precision
From (2), the precision function is decreasing and convex in v and that zero investment generates no information, i.e.,
The parameter k measures the capability of acquiring information. Given the investment v , the retailer with a smaller value of k can acquire the more accurate signal.
Because of overconfidence, however, the retailer not only overestimates the precision of her information but also the capability to acquire information [21] .
We assume that the retailer's subjective precision has the following functional form:
where her level of overconfidence is given by the parameter 1 ,
Because there is a tradeoff between the cost of acquiring this information and the benefit obtained from using this information, the overconfident retailer first needs to decide investment level v . After acquiring forecasts, the retailer updates her knowledge of the demand, determines the order quantity, q, to be placed with the supplier, and makes a payment according to the wholesale price contract w > c. The supplier then produces an exact amount of q units, which costs his c·q, and delivers them to the retailer. Finally, demand occurs and is filled from the stocked inventory as much as possible, during which the unit selling price is p > w. Without loss of generality, we assume a zero penalty cost and zero salvage value, so the overage cost is the cost of procurement, and the underage cost is the loss of profit.
Unbiased Integrated System
To better understand the effect of overconfidence on information acquisition investment, we first consider a benchmark case in which the supplier and the retailer are owned by an unbiased central decision maker. The central decision maker first decides on the information-acquisition level, then determines the optimal production quantity given the forecast x. We solve the problem backwards.
Given v and x, the central decision maker determines q to maximize
− . Let ( ) φ ⋅ and ( ) Φ ⋅ be the probability density function (pdf) and the cumulative density function (cdf) of the standard normal distribution, respectively. From Porteus [22] , we obtain the optimal value of q as ( )
min , 1 
The second and third term of Equation (4) represents the demand-uncertainty cost and the cost of acquiring information, respectively. The demand-uncertainty cost decreases due to the improvement in information's precision. Hence, the optimal investment level is determined by the tradeoff between the second term and third one, which is ( ) 
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Decentralized System
In this section, we analyze a decentralized setting where the firms make decisions to maximize their own profits. Given the investment level v , the overconfident retailer believe he would obtain the signal x with the precision ( ) 
and then decreasing for ( )
Proof: For (a), consider the profit function stated in (6) . It can be verified that On the other hand, the supplier produces the exact quantity ordered by the retailer and receives an expected profit of ( ) supplier's performance. When the wholesale price is relatively large, i.e., 
Channel Coordination
Under rational player assumption, it is well known that a wholesale price contract cannot coordinate a supply chain due to double marginalization. In this section, we examine whether channel coordination is feasible in the presence of overconfidence. For the first-best benchmark, the equilibrium expected order 
In the decentralized system, the equilibrium expected order quantities under the wholesale price contract can be expressed as confidence hurts the retailer's profits, and even eliminates the benefit of information. However, this bias can have a positive effect on the supplier's performance. Finally, we demonstrate that overconfidence with endogenous information acquisition can coordinate the supply chain. In presence of overconfidence, therefore, channel coordination can be achieved under the wholesale price contract.
